

EXPANDING ADVERSARIAL RISK ANALYSIS TO SIMULTANEOUS DECISION IN DYNAMIC GAME

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Abstract

We expand adversarial risk analysis beyond simultaneous play to simultaneous decision in dynamic game. We introduce the general model of simultaneous decision in dynamic game, on which we make the international tariff rates model based. Besides, we give the concrete algorithm related to the international tariff model and figures for the numerical example.

Keywords and phrases: adversarial risk analysis, game theory, dynamic game, international tariff model.

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